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How NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF BRAIN INJURY, VEGETATIVE STATES AND
THE LAW
Glenn R. Butterton*
The author examines clinical studies that use neuroscience
technology to study patients in Vegetative States. The studies
indicate that some of the patients are, in fact, conscious. The author
suggests that this finding is a matter of considerable practical
importance for the drafting and execution of end-of-life protocols
such as Advance Directives and Living Wills. He recommends that
statutes, and other guidance used by patients, caregivers, medical
institutions, family members and others to draft and interpret such
Directives and Wills, be revised or amended to take account of these
results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a car crash, a violent one. There are fatalities. The
survivors all have badly broken bodies, and your loved one, Lucky,
is among them. She is alive but unconscious. After a month, Lucky
still has not regained consciousness, so the attending physician puts
Lucky in the category "persistent vegetative state." In this category,
a patient is regarded, in effect, as a kind of human potato, a living
body with no mind and no experience of consciousness. After a year
without improvement, Lucky is further downgraded to the category
"permanent vegetative state." At this point, the physician, acting in
accordance with methods and theories generally accepted by the
medical science community, has determined there is virtually no
chance that Lucky will ever regain consciousness.
That determination has profound personal consequences for
Lucky and her loved ones, of course, but can have profound legal
consequences as well. In particular, it can trigger a provision in an
Advance Directive, a legally binding instrument signed by Lucky.
That provision instructs Lucky's medical caregivers, upon
determining that she is in a permanent vegetative state, to disconnect
her from life support devices. As a result, she will expire. That
outcome would be consistent with Lucky's intentions and wishes
when originally signing the Advance Directive-the point was, after
[VOL. 20:331
Neuroscience Technology
all, to ensure her something like "death with dignity"' rather than
life as a mindless organism attached indefinitely to electrodes,
hoses, and machines. Lucky might have expressed the idea like this:
Well, if the doctor thinks I've been hurt so badly that I've turned into a
turnip or a carrot, with pretty much no chance of waking up or getting
back to normal, let's just pull the plug then, and get it over with. I don't
want to live that way.., that really isn't living. Besides I don't want to
be a bother or an expense for anyone else.
As we shall see in the data presented below, this tragic
circumstance is not a particularly exotic one in the healthcare world.
Moreover, the reasoning that drives the decision-making process
used by Lucky and others when signing the Directive seems sound
and appealing, however grim the subject matter.
Having reached the "point of no return" where experts advise
that we will almost certainly never regain consciousness, many of
us would opt, if we had a chance to plan, for a "death with dignity"
scenario and would execute an Advance Directive. But here's the
rub. What if Lucky is not actually beyond the point of no return, but
you don't know it, and Lucky's physician doesn't know it? Would
we want the plug to be pulled in such a circumstance? To be blunt,
that was not Lucky's intention or wish when signing the Directive.
A well-informed and benevolent observer might ask those who are
about to pull the proverbial plug: (a) whether and how new
developments at the frontiers of neuroscience might matter for
Lucky and others who are similarly situated, and (b) whether those
developments should compel changes in laws, regulations,
guidelines, and the actions of caregivers concerned with Advance
Directives, brain injury, and vegetative states.
In what follows, we will step into the shoes of such a benevolent
observer. Among our central questions will be these: can patients in
vegetative states nonetheless be conscious?2 And, if so, can
I See, e.g., TINOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND
TAKING CHARGE (1994).
2 Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum are credited with introducing the expression
"persistent vegetative state" in 1972. See Bryan Jennett & Fred Plum, Persistent
Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A Syndrome in Search of a Name, 299
LANCET 734, 736 (1972). See infra discussion accompanying note 7, for the
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advanced neuroscience technology reveal the existence of
consciousness and conventional mental states in such patients
despite all other conventional indications to the contrary? We will
see that for some patients, at least, the surprising answer to these
questions is "yes." Recent research with PVS patients has made
effective use of neuroscience technology, such as Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("fMRI") machines and other tools,3
and produced quite promising insights into these difficult and
sensitive matters.4 In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that
some of the research has produced powerful evidence that certain
PVS patients are conscious and possess significant cognitive
ability.' The consequences are far reaching for patients and loved
ones and for the law of Advance Directives and end of life protocols
as well.
Below, we describe in Section I the basics of persistent and
permanent vegetative states ("PVS") and review what I call the
traditional clinical account ("Traditional Account")' and its
approach to consciousness, mental states and behavior in PVS
difference between "permanent" and "persistent" vegetative states, and other
conditions.
I For example, Positron Emission Tomography ("PET"), Computed
Tomography ("CT"), Electro-encephalography ("EEG"), and Single Photon
Emission Computed Tomography ("SPECT"). See generally Marcus E. Raichle,
A Brief History of Human Brain Mapping, 32 TRENDS iN NEUROSCIENCES 118
(2008) (containing an informative historical review of these technologies).
4 See, e.g., Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in
Disorders of Consciousness, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 579, 585-89 (2010) (using
fMRI to support awareness in a vegetative or minimally conscious state).
I Id. But see P. Nachev & P.M.S. Hacker, Covert Cognition in the Persistent
Vegetative States, 91 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 68, 68 (2010), for a critical
perspective.
6 See generally Multi-Soc'y Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the
Persistent Vegetative State (First of Two Parts), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1499
(1994) [hereinafter MSTF I]; Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects
of the Persistent Vegetative State (Second of Two Parts), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1572 (1994) [hereinafter MSTF II]. Many professional groups participated in the
task-force, including the American Neurological Association, the American
Academy of Neurology, the Child Neurology Society, the American Academy of
Pediatrics, and the American Association of Neurological Surgeons.
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patients and others who have suffered serious brain injury.7 We then
discuss, in Sections 11I and IV, recent research with PVS patients,
the nature of the diagnostic challenge facing clinicians, and data on
misdiagnosis. Finally, we review in Section V legal descriptions of
PVS in current state guidelines, statutes and other materials, which
are used to shape Advance Directives and "living wills," 8 and to
educate patients, family members, and caregivers. We conclude
with recommendations for law makers, regulators, and health-care
professionals who care for brain injured patients on a daily basis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Phenomenon
In their 2005 paper, Beaumont and Kenealy estimated that he
occurrence of PVS cases enduring for six months or more is between
5 and 25 per million in the United Kingdom, and between 40 and
168 per million in the United States.' As such numbers suggest, the
average person is unlikely to fall victim to PVS or encounter it
among relatives or friends. From time to time, certain cases have
captured public attention in the popular press because they have
been politically or ethically controversial, or notable for other
I See generally JAMES L. BERNAT, ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEUROLOGY 283-305
(2nd ed. 2002); BRITISH MEDIC. ASS'N, BMA GUIDELINES ON TREATMENT
DECISIONS FOR PATIENTS IN PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATES (1996); BRYAN
JENNETr, THE VEGETATIVE STATE: MEDICAL FACTS, ETHICAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS 1-32 (2002); Megan Alcauskas, Prognosis and Therapy After Cardiac
Arrest-Induced Coma, 11 AMA J. ETHICS 617 (2009) (defining and distinguishing
consciousness and coma); Quality Standards Subcomm., Am. Acad. Neurology,
Practice Parameters. Assessment and Management of Patients in the Persistent
Vegetative State, 45 NEUROLOGY 1015 (1995) (responding to MSTF I and MSTF
II); Adam Zeman, Persistent Vegetative State, 350 LANCET 795 (1997) (placing
"PVS in the context of current understanding" of recent findings in the field).
8 Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, a Proposal, 44 IND.
L.J. 539, 551 (1969).
9 J. Graham Beaumont & Pamela M. Kenealy, Incidence and Prevalence of the
Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, 15 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
REHABILITATION 184, 188 (2005). Data collection is somewhat hampered by the
hazards of misdiagnosis. It seems even in industrialized countries, cases may be
under-reported because they develop in nursing homes, assisted living facilities
or private residences rather than hospitals.
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reasons. Among those that have received considerable attention in
recent years have been the cases of Theresa Schiavo,1° Sunny von
Btilow, Karen Ann Quinlan,12 Nancy Beth Cruzan,13 and Ariel
Sharon, the former Prime Minister of Israel. 14
According to the Traditional Account and similar
characterizations, the PVS patient typically presents with cycles of
sleep and wakefulness, and may have open eyes. But the patient
seems not to have what physicians call awareness, or what the
average person might call consciousness.5 Using a biomedical
idiom, one might say the physician believes the patient to have no
awareness of self or environment. Alternatively, in more vernacular
speech, one might say the physician believes the patient to have a
complete lack of consciousness. When physically examined, the
patient shows "no evidence of language comprehension or
expression" and "no evidence of sustained, reproducible,
10 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); In
re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Abby
Goodnough, Schiavo Dies, Ending Bitter Case Over Feeding Tube, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/01/us/schiavo-dies-ending-
bitter-case-over-feeding-tube.html.
11 State v. von Btilow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875
(1984); Enid Nemy, Sunny von Bfilow, 76, Focus of Society Drama, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/nyregion/07vonbul
ow.html.
" In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Robert McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan,
31, Dies; Focus Of '76 Right to Die Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1985),
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/12/nyregion/karen-ann-quinlan-3 1 dies-
focus-of-76-right-to-die-case.html.
13 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (affirming the
Supreme Court of Missouri's finding that it was acceptable to require "clear and
convincing evidence" of a patient's wishes for removal of life support); Tamar
Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/us/nancy-cruzan-
dies-outlived-by-a-debate-over-the-right-to-die.html.
"4 Isabel Kershner, Sharon Brain Scan Shows Response to Stimuli, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world/middleeast/ariel-
sharon-brain-scan-shows-response-to-stimuli.html.
15 Physicians also use "alertness." For convenience, I shall use "awareness" and
"consciousness" interchangeably to the extent that grammar and style permit.
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purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to visual, auditory,
tactile, or noxious stimuli."' 6
Among other curious aspects of the condition are that the patient
is not necessarily immobile. In some cases, for example, the patient
can move the trunk or limbs in what are described as "meaningless,"
which is to say non-intentional, ways. 17 The patient may also seem
to smile, or become tearful, and may sometimes make sounds
normally associated with grunting, moaning or screaming.8 But
these activities, too, are typically described as "non-intentional" or
"non-purposeful" and downplayed because they may "misleadingly
suggest purposeful movements."'9 After the patient presents, or
seems to present, the diagnostic criteria enumerated in the
Traditional Account for a period of one month, the patient will be
placed in the PVS category.2"
B. Causal Factors
How does PVS come about? The condition can be the result of
a host of causal factors, including acute traumatic injuries, such as
motor vehicle mishaps, gunshot wounds and rock climbing
accidents, and non-traumatic injuries, such as suffocation, cardio-
respiratory arrest, cerebral hemorrhage, cerebral infarction, and
16 See MSTF I, supra note 6, at 1500. The list of diagnostic criteria presented
by the MSTF in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1994 is the locus
classicus:
The vegetative state can be diagnosed according to the following criteria:
(1) no evidence of awareness of self or environment and an inability to
interact with others; (2) no evidence of sustained, reproducible,
purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile,
or noxious stimuli; (3) no evidence of language comprehension or
expression; (4) intermittent wakefulness manifested by the presence of
sleep-wake cycles; (5) sufficiently preserved hypothalamic and brain-
stem autonomic functions to permit survival with medical and nursing
care; (6) bowel and bladder incontinence; and (7) variably preserved
cranial-nerve reflexes (pupillary, oculocephalic, corneal, vestibulo-




19Id.20 Id. at 1501.
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bacterial meningitis.21 It can also result from degenerative and
metabolic disorders, such as Alzheimer's Disease, Parkinson's
Disease, Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease, Pick's Disease, and
Huntington's Disease, and developmental malformations, such as
congenital hydrocephalus, hydranencephaly, and anencephaly.
2
C. Related Phenomena & Some Complexities of Recovery
The vegetative state is similar to certain other related conditions
clinicians will consider when making a differential diagnosis. These
include, for example, the comatose state, the minimally conscious
state, the "locked-in" state, and the brain-dead state.23
When a patient suffers a serious brain injury or brain-related
disorder brought about by the causal factors above, the fervent hope
of loved ones and caregivers is that the patient will make at least a
partial, if not a full recovery. In practice, the patient may pass
through one or more states along the theoretical road to possible
recovery. But he or she may also get stuck, failing to progress
beyond a particular state. Or the patient may simply lose the physical
battle, expiring during the recovery process.
Suppose, for example, a car accident victim is found to be
comatose. Unlike the PVS patient, who will undergo sleep-wake
cycles and lack awareness,. the comatose patient will lack both
wakefulness and awareness, and will typically lie passive with
21 Id. at 1503-05.
22Id.; see also HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 133-35
(Eugene Braunwald et al. eds., 15th ed. 2001).
23 See Hal Blumenfeld, The Neurological Examination of Consciousness, in
THE NEUROLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND
NEUROPATHOLOGY 15-28 (Steven Laureys & Giulio Tononi eds., 2009); Caroline
Schnakers & Steve Majerus, Behavioral Assessment and Diagnosis of Disorders
of Consciousness, in COMA AND DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2-6 (Caroline
Schnakers & Steven Laureys eds., 2012); see also PLUM AND POSNER'S
DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 342-86 (Jerome B. Posner et al. eds., 4th ed.
2007). For the ordinary non-expert-the proverbial man or woman in the street-




closed eyes.24 Assuming the patient does not subsequently suffer
brain death, an irreversible condition in which all voluntary and
involuntary brain activity has ceased,25 the patient may progress to a
PVS condition.26 Alternatively, the patient may progress to a so-
called "locked-in" state, and possess both wakefulness and
awareness, while typically lacking all motor control except for
intentional eye movement.2 7 Following Jerome Posner, one might
say PVS patients "look conscious but are unconscious," whereas the
"locked-in" patients "look unconscious but are conscious.
'28
As we saw with Lucky, a patient who is in a persistent vegetative
state and then fails to improve after one year is not realistically
expected to get better.29 Using traditional diagnostic approaches, that
patient will typically be re-classified into the category of
"permanent vegetative state." But the persistent vegetative state
patient who does improve within a year may enter the category of
Minimally Conscious State ("MCS").30 While MCS patients may be
regarded as having severely altered consciousness, they present
behavior that suggests to clinicians an awareness of self or
24 See MSTF I, supra note 6, at 1501 (explaining that awareness and
wakefulness are the two states that determine consciousness, and that lacking
either indicates medical unconsciousness).
21 When properly confirmed by physicians, brain death, unlike PVS, can serve
as the basis of a legal declaration of death. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT
§ 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1981).
26 MSTF I, supra note 6, at 1502-03.
27 Id. In the more extreme variant, the locked-in patient lacks motor control of
the eyes as well. See G. Bauer et al., Varieties of the Locked-in Syndrome, 221 J.
NEUROLOGY 77, 84-85 (1979); Steven Laureys et al., The Locked-in Syndrome:
What is it Like to be Conscious but Paralyzed and Voiceless?, in SER. NO. 150,
PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 495, 501 (Steven Laureys ed., 2005) (noting in
some cases, the eyelids may need to be manually opened to verify eye
movements).
28 Lawrence K Altman, Fred Plum, Neurologist Who Helped Coin 'Persistent
Vegetative State,'Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2010) (quoting Dr. Jerome
Posner), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/health/13plum.html.
29 Eelco F. M. Wijdicks & Ronald E. Cranford, ClinicalDiagnosis of Prolonged
States of Impaired Consciousness inAdults, 80 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1037, 1044
(2005).
30 See Joseph Giacino & John Whyte, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious
States: Current Knowledge and Remaining Questions, 20 J. HEAD TRAUMA
REHABILITATION 30, 37 (2005).
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environment." Such behavior includes, for example, the ability to
follow simple commands, to answer yes-no questions with gestures,
to produce meaningful utterances, to smile or cry appropriately in
response to stimuli, to move the eyes in conventional ways, and to
reach for, touch and grasp objects.
3 2
Occasionally, those who suffer the type of serious brain injury
or disorder discussed above may experience some form of recovery,
but the duration of the wait-and-see process can vary from hours to
weeks to months or even years. The outcomes cannot be known in
advance and can vary greatly. Two long-term cases provide stunning
examples. In the first, Terry Wallis was gravely injured in an auto
accident in 1984, but emerged into consciousness from PVS after 19
years in 2003.11 In the second, Sunny von Bilow endured PVS
without recovery for nearly 28 years before dying in 2008.
34
D. Misdiagnoses
The physical patient behavior that clinicians study in assessing
a patient may be difficult to interpret for a number of reasons: the
patient may be inactive during one examination, but active during
another. Or the patient's condition may improve from one day to
31 See, e.g., In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151,154-55 (Cal. 2001). Robert Wendland
entered a Minimally Conscious State after suffering a head injury in an
automobile accident. Id. at 154. He had not completed an Advance Directive, and
his spouse sought to have him removed from life support, despite his mother's
wishes to the contrary. Id. at 155. The California Supreme Court ruled that his
wife did not have the authority to refuse life support, finding that patients who are
unable to make a decision for themselves should receive special protection based
in constitutional rights to life and privacy. Id. at 159, 162-63, 175.
32 J.T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic
Criteria, 58 NEUROLOGY 349,350-51 (2002); see also Stephen Ashwal & Ronald
Cranford, The Minimally Conscious State in Children, 9 SEMINARS PEDIATRIC
NEUROLOGY 19, 20-21(2002).
33 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Terry Talks, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2003)
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/jul/11 /health.lifeandhealth.
34 See Nemy, supra, note 11. Sunny von Bfilow's second husband, Claus von
Bilow, was suspected of trying to cause her death with an insulin overdose and
was convicted of attempted murder, but the conviction was overturned on appeal,
following which he was found not guilty in a second trial. For an account written
by Claus von Bilow's attorney, law professor Alan Dershowitz, see ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INSIDE THE VON BOLOw CASE (1986).
[VOL. 20:331340
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another, though it may also move in the opposite direction, from
better to worse. For these reasons, the patient's condition is
something of a moving target.35 As a result, even in optimal
circumstances, the behavior may be susceptible to conflicting
interpretations, and therefore vulnerable to misdiagnoses.36 The rate
of misdiagnosis in cases involving disorders of consciousness
appears to be alarmingly high, perhaps on the order of 40%.17 In the
1990s, 37% of PVS patients in one study were re-diagnosed after
misdiagnosis, and in another, 43% were re-diagnosed.38
III. RECENT RESEARCH
Recent research sheds new light on the PVS phenomenon, and
suggests the problem of misdiagnosis may be worse than previously
thought. That work has involved PVS patients in various
experimental settings, and the use of various neuroscientific tools
and methods including fMRI, PET, SPECT, and EEG.3 9
3 Dr. Adrian Owen has informally reported an exemplary case: a PVS patient
was participating in an IMRI experiment and showed no brain activation
whatsoever, but when scanned the next day the patient showed completely normal
activation. See Jerome Groopman, Silent Minds. What Scanning Techniques are
Revealing About Vegetative Patients, NEW YORKER (Oct. 15, 2007),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/10/15/silent-minds.
36 See Keith Andrews et al., Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State. Retrospective
Study in a Rehabilitation Unit, 313 BMJ 13, 15 (1996). In the Nancy Jobes case,
four physicians were equally divided over whether the patient was in a PVS state
or a state more akin to minimal consciousness. The judge found PVS to be the
proper diagnosis. As a result, the patient's feeding tube was removed and she was
allowed to die in keeping with a petition filed by her husband. In re Jobes, 529
A.2d 434, 451-52 (N.J. 1987); Joan Beck, Nancy Jobes: A Long Fight to End a
Case of Endless Dying, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 1987),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm- 1987-08-10-8702280716-
story.html.
37 See Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313
SEX. 1402, 1402 (2006) [hereinafter Owen et. al., Detecting Awareness]; see also
Monti et al., supra note 4, at 580.
38 Nancy L. Childs et al., Accuracy ofDiagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State,
43 NEUROLOGY 1465, 1465-67 (1993); Andrews et al., supra note 36, at 13.
19 See Raichle, supra note 3, at 118. Much of this work has been done by Adrian
Owen, Steve Laureys and their colleagues at the University of Cambridge (Great
Britain), the University of Liege (Belgium) and the University of Western Ontario
(Canada). See Adrian Owen et al., The Assessment of Conscious Awareness in the
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A. Imagery Tasks: Tennis and Navigation
In the stunning recent work that concerns this article
4°
researchers instructed a patient to perform certain imagery tasks
while in an tMRI scanner. The patient, who had been unresponsive
five months after a traffic accident, was verbally asked to think
about playing tennis and also navigating or walking through rooms
in her home.41 In healthy subjects, one finds that specific brain areas
are activated during the performance of these tasks.42 For tennis
playing, which involves motor skills, the supplemental motor cortex
is typically activated, and for navigation, which concerns orientation
and the recognition of places, areas such as the para-hippocampal
gyrus and the visual cortex are activated.43 The traffic accident
victim showed exactly the same activations." In subsequent work
with a large patient group of 54, the same verbal instructions were
given, and five of those experimental patients, or roughly ten percent
of the group, showed activation in exactly the same areas as the
healthy subjects.4
These results are of great interest since they appear to indicate
that the patients in the subset were capable of following instructions.
This is important because instructions fall within the linguistic
category of commands, and the ability to carry out commands
strongly suggests that the patients possess cognitive ability of some
significant degree.
46
Vegetative State, in THE NEUROLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROPATHOLOGY 163, 168 (Steven Laureys & Giulio
Tononi eds., 2009) [hereinafter Owen et al., Assessment of Conscious Awareness];
see also Monti et al., supra note 4, at 581.
40 The initial work was reported by Adrian Owen and his team in 2006. See





41 Four of the five were PVS patients. Monti et al., supra note 4, at 582-83.
46 It is widely assumed that those brain activations are proxies for the neural
correlates of consciousness. See Owen et al., Detecting Awareness, supra note 37.
[VOL. 20:331342
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B. A Novel Way to Say "Yes" and "No"
A key follow-up experiment measurably advanced the
conceptual ball. In that case, Patient No. 23 from the tennis and
navigation group was asked to communicate with the researchers
using a more complex signaling system.47 She was instructed to
answer yes-no questions by making special use of the mental
imagery exercise: when asked a question by a researcher, she could
answer "Yes" by thinking of playing tennis, and "No" by thinking
of navigating through the rooms of her home.48 The respective fM\4RI
activations would thus count in that context as speech acts of assent
("Yes") and dissent ("No"). The researchers then asked a series of
yes-no questions to which they knew the answers ("Do you have any
brothers?" or "Is your father's name Alexander?" and so on).49 In
this circumstance, the patient correctly answered five questions, but
did not respond to a sixth."0
C. Photographs & Sentences
Previously, experimenters had achieved promising results when
using face and sentence recognition tasks. Kate Bainbridge was a
26-year-old school teacher who entered PVS after developing flu-
like symptoms and then falling into a coma.51 The experimenter
placed her in a PET scanner and projected in her visual field
photographs of her family, which he alternated with images of faces
47 Monti et al., supra note 4, at 584.
48Id. at 584-85. The fMRI device measures blood flow in the brain which is
represented by the so-called Blood Oxygen Level Dependent signal (often
referred to by the acronym BOLD). Id. at 587.
49Id. at 585.
50 See id. The patient did not respond at all to the sixth question for unclear
reasons, though it is possible she had fallen asleep. Id. Some critics of these results
suggest he brain may be simply responding to a familiar name by reflex. The idea
is that when the name of the patient's father is mentioned in the patient's presence,
her brain reacts to the wave form in a mechanical way. Researchers howed that
potential "reflex" names could be inserted into other sentences that the patient
would find false without generating the "reflex" response. For example, suppose
the patient's father was named X, and also that the patient never owned a dog.
Given those circumstances, the patient would be expected to answer "yes" when
asked "Is your father's name X?" but "No" when asked "Do you have a dog
named X?"
51 David Cyranoski, The Mind Reader, 486 NATURE 178, 179 (2012).
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that were so digitally-distorted as to be unrecognizable. Whenever
the family faces appeared, her brain showed activation in the
Fusiform Gyrus, which is used for the highly specialized task of face
recognition, and her Fusiform activations were identical to those of
healthy control subjects.2
In other work, experimenters shifted from visual imagery to
speech sounds, but using an analogous method, exposed patients to
recordings of simple sentences alternating with nonsense sounds or
"noise."53 In those cases, PVS patients showed the same tMRI
activations in response to the recordings as healthy volunteers.
Likewise, when ambiguous entences were used, two PVS patients
showed the very same tMRI activations-those of a brain struggling
to interpret words-as those of healthy volunteers. 
5 4
D. Recovering Consciousness
Beyond devising enhancements to these basic fMRI
communication systems, one would like to create increasingly
sophisticated brain-machine interfaces that would make it possible
for patients to engage in a greater range of expression. Such
developments would allow them, as Steven Laureys puts it, "to
express their feelings and thoughts, control their environment and
52 See D. K. Menon et al., Cortical Processing in Persistent Vegetative State,
352 LANCET 200, 200 (1998). For a discussion of the Fusiform Face Area, see
generally Nancy Kanwisher et al., The Fusiform Face Area: A Module in Human
Extrastriate Cortex Specialized for Face Perception, 17 J. NEuROSC[ENCE 4302
(1997); K. M. O'Craven & N. Kanwisher, Mental Imagery of Faces and Places
Activates Corresponding Stimulus-Specific Brain Regions, 12 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 1013 (2000).
13 See, e.g., Matthew H. Davis et al., Dissociating Speech Perception and
Comprehension at Reduced Levels of Awareness, 104 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SC.
16032, 16032 (2007); Adrian M. Owen et al., Residual Auditory Function in
Persistent Vegetative State: A Combined PET and JAM Study, 15
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL REHABILITATION 290, 292-98 (2005).
4 See Davis et al., supra note 53, at 16033; Owen et al., Residual Auditory
Function, supra note 53, at 290-91. The volunteers were physicians who were
exposed to the sentences under anesthesia, and the MtRI scans showed that the
relevant brain activations were inversely proportional to the degree of anesthesia.
See Davis et al., supra note 53, at 16036.
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increase their quality of life."55 The cases of Rom Houben and Kate
Bainbridge provide important examples of high-tech and low-tech
devices of these types that have made a difference in the lives of
some patients.
Rom Houben appeared to enter PVS as a result of a 1983
automobile crash in Belgium. After 23 years as a PVS patient, fMRI
scanning results suggested Houben was conscious. Subsequently,
with the help of a finger over which he had some control, Houben
learned to use an interactive keyboard, with which he explained that,
in fact, he had been conscious throughout he entire period since the
accident, a span that covered more than two decades.56
Kate Bainbridge, following her good fortune with the face
recognition task, made a significant but slow recovery, regaining a
great deal of cognitive function, linguistic function, and the use of
her arms.57 She learned to use a letter board to communicate because
some of her interlocutors had difficulty understanding her still
imperfect speech. She has poignantly observed: "It really scares me
to think what might have happened to me if I had not had the scans.
They show people it was worth carrying on even though my body
was unresponsive."58
IV. THE DIAGNOSTIC CHALLENGE
Standard PVS represents an extraordinary downgrading of
normal neurological and cognitive functioning, including a
complete loss of consciousness. However, the Bainbridge and
Houben cases, and similar cases and experimental results, seem to
show pointedly that despite the appearance of Traditional Account
criteria to the contrary, some patients may nonetheless be conscious.
11 Sarah Boseley, Think Tennis for Yes, Home for No: How Doctors Helped
Man in Vegetative State, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3,2010), https://www.theguardian.com
/science/2010/feb/03/vegetative-state-patient-communication.
56 Manfred Dworschak, 'My Second Birth': Discovering Life in Vegetative
Patients, SPIEGEL ONLINE: INT'L (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/
intemational/spiegel/my-second-birth-discovering-life-in-vegetative-patients-a-
663022.html.
11 See Groopman, supra note 35.58 Id.
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This suggests that the problem of misdiagnosis may be much more
challenging than previously thought.
A. Does Consciousness Exist in the Patient?
One might say the clinician faces a problem of existence,
specifically, whether or not consciousness actually exists in the
patient (the problem of existence is sometimes called the
"ontological" problem). But the challenge of the clinician also
concerns a problem of knowledge, specifically, how the clinician
can know whether consciousness exists in the patient (the problem
of knowledge is sometimes called the "epistemological" problem).
In the course of making external observations of patient
behavior, clinicians see behavior they believe to be so abnormal that
it cannot be intentional, which in turn leads to the inference that PVS
patients lack consciousness entirely. The challenge of explicitly
identifying the signs of such abnormality is so difficult that, while
guided by the criteria in the Traditional Account,59 it leans heavily
on each clinician's intuitions. The experimental results discussed
above suggest that those intuitions and patterns of inference are
inadequate and problematic.60
Bainbridge, Houben, and similar cases demonstrate that
consciousness and a normal range of mental states can still exist in
PVS patients, even though the standard motor commands that the
patients previously used to produce externally observable physical
5 MSTF I, supra note 6.
60 If we label each clinician's threshold of extreme abnormality "degree D," the
problematic clinical reasoning can be captured this way: (1) Any prospective PVS
patient whose externally observable physical behavior appears abnormal to degree
D cannot be acting intentionally, (2) Patient P's externally observable physical
behavior appears to be abnormal to degree D, therefore, (3) patient P's externally
observable physical behavior cannot be intentional. Further, the clinician's
problematic reasoning as to the question whether the patient possesses awareness
or consciousness can be captured this way: (4) Any prospective PVS patient
whose externally observable physical behavior appears abnormal to degree D
does not possess awareness or consciousness, (5) Patient P's externally observable
physical behavior appears abnormal to degree D, therefore, (6) Patient P does not
possess awareness or consciousness. The Bainbridge and Houben cases suggest
that the major premises ((1) and (4)) in these inferences are false, and lead to false
and misleading conclusions ((3) and (6)).
[VOL. 20:331
Neuroscience Technology
behavior have gone seriously awry. In these circumstances,
clinicians who are only able to examine external behavior face a
knowledge barrier that compels them to answer the question of
existence in the negative. That is, consciousness does not exist in the
PVS patient. But, in fact, fMRI and other technologies are now
available that serve to penetrate the knowledge barrier by permitting
observations of patient behavior from a different point of view.
Those observations can arguably be characterized as proxies for the
patient's internal point of view. As a result, clinicians equipped with
fMRI observations may sometimes be warranted in answering the
existence question in the affirmative; that is, they might reasonably
conclude that consciousness and self-awareness do likely exist to
some degree in certain PVS patients.
B. Misdiagnosis Redux
We noted earlier that, even in optimal circumstances, the
behavior of PVS patients may be susceptible to conflicting
interpretations and misdiagnoses.61 Let's now look more closely at
the process involved. To review, the diagnostic criteria of the
Traditional Account are external in the sense that the physician
primarily reviews external behavioral evidence presented by the
patient. On that basis, the physician makes certain inferences as to
whether the patient possesses awareness or consciousness.62 Thus,
the physician determines that the patient shows, for example, "no
evidence of language comprehension or expression" and "no
evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary
behavioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious
stimuli. ,63 Dr. Fred Plum made the point in the following way while
testifying in the Jobes case:
[The] [v]egetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in
terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart
beat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It
maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned
61 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62 See Blumenfeld, supra note 23, at 20-21.
63 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness
or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
64
It is especially noteworthy that even though some behavior, as
described in the Traditional Account, may actually be suggestive of
intentional action by the patient-such as smiling, becoming tearful,
making grunting, moaning, or screaming sounds-the behavior is
seen by the clinician using the Traditional Account to "misleadingly
suggest" purposeful or intentional movements. Thus, the clinician,
in effect, strips away intention from his or her perception of the
prospective PVS patient's behavior. And then that "absence" of
intention is seen as a powerful indication that the patient does not
possess consciousness at all.
However, cases like Bainbridge and Houben suggest that a
physician may err in stripping away hints of intention from the
patient's outrd behavior. In those cases, it may be that behavior such
as smiling, becoming tearful, and making grunting, moaning, or
screaming sounds does not "misleadingly suggest" purposeful or
intentional movements, but properly suggests them.65 This is the
upshot of the insight that the patient's behavior may be susceptible
to conflicting interpretations, and therefore misdiagnoses. In this
sense, the behavioral evidence can support multiple, not necessarily
consistent, theories.
Consider that an arm moving might be correctly interpreted in
one case as an intentional act by someone with the full cognitive
powers of a healthy person, but in another case, the identical arm
movement could be correctly interpreted as a non-purposeful,
random event caused by the body of a PVS patient with no cognitive
powers or conventional motor control. Yet, in a third case, the
identical movement could be correctly seen as the product of an
intention formed by a PVS patient, whose motor command failed to
execute properly due to a nervous system malfunction, even though
the patient was, unbeknownst to observers, conscious to a
significant degree.
Thus, the phenomenon poses something of a taxonomical mess.
Some may wish to describe the extraordinary cases that have
61 In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987).
65 See supra Part II.D for a discussion on the Bainbridge and Houben cases.
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concerned us above as "previously unknown high-functioning
Minimally Conscious State cases" that should not have been
characterized as PVS. Others may wish to call them PVS cases of a
new sub-type in which consciousness has been undetectable without
the aid of special tools such as fMRI. Others may think an entirely
new category is warranted. The upshot for our purposes, however,
is more practical: a patient diagnosed as lacking in consciousness
may, in fact, possess it, and with the assistance of new methods and
neuroscientific tools, such as tMRI scans and re-formulated patient
examination algorithms, the clinician may succeed in avoiding a
misdiagnosis and its potentially grave consequences (including the
unwarranted and arguably unlawful removal of a patient from life
support).
In an earnest attempt to do just that, Adrian Owen scanned his
Canadian patients twice a day for three days.66 Likewise, Steve
Laureys implemented a testing procedure for his Belgian patients
which features 25 patient tasks.67 These included grasping objects
and reacting to sounds, each of which patients had to successfully
perform repeatedly as a way of ruling out random reflexes.68 Further,
the Belgian government has imposed a legal requirement that Steve
Laureys's procedure be used in all government-run nursing homes.
69
V. CLINICAL AND LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS
A. Degradation, Indignity and Loss of Consciousness
Loss of consciousness is a key quality-of-life concern in PVS
cases. We closely identify consciousness with our humanity, and if
we are robbed of it by PVS, we may regard our quality of life as
greatly degraded, so much so that words such as "undignified" are
sometimes used to characterize it. For some, but not all, the adjective
"vegetative" expresses that degradation and loss of dignity. For
example, Jennet and Plum thought the adjective was a neutral term
with no derogatory connotations.7" But Raphael Cohen-Almagor
I Groopman, supra note 35.
67 Dworschak, supra note 56.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Jennet & Plum, supra note 2.
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calls it "ethically suspect," observing that "[n] o one would like to be
treated as a carrot or a potato, nor would anyone like the idea that a
loved one would be treated as such."'" He adds that because
"language is-to a great extent-a reality-building instrument, a
warning should be raised against the use of discriminatory and
demeaning terms that could cause medical personnel to disrespect
patients.
'72
Against the backdrop of this debate, it is worth noting that an
expert assessment by a physician that the loss of consciousness is
virtually permanent can be devastating and dispositive for family
and friends. Indeed, it can play a key role in the decision to withdraw
life support from the PVS patient, either by Advance Directive or
through instructions given by a surrogate or clinicians in a default
situation. Your determination to help your loved one Lucky cling to
life in the hope of regaining consciousness may be greatly weakened
in the face of a physician's declaration that Lucky is almost certain
to live life as nothing more than a vegetable going forward. Thus,
the consequences of mistakenly informing family members or
surrogates that there has been a permanent loss of consciousness
when, in fact, consciousness may not have been lost permanently or
at all, may be irreversible.
Of course, one wants to avoid such catastrophic outcomes by
ensuring to the extent practical that physicians, caregivers, family
members, attorneys, and others potentially involved in crafting
Advance Directives and shaping end-of-life protocols are
adequately informed of the complexities of PVS diagnosis. That is,
in any specific case, one wants to take all reasonable measures to
inform relevant decision makers as to recent research results and
advances in technology that may shed important light on whether a
patient may have suffered a perceived loss of consciousness,
permanent or otherwise.
71 See Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Language and Reality at the End of Life, 28
J.L., MED. & ETHICS, 267, 269 (2000).
72 Id. Others, too, have described the word as pejorative. See generally C.




B. Guidance for Advance Directives, Living Wills & End of
Life Protocols
The Advance Directive, and similar instruments such as the
Living Will, are built on a strong belief in the idea that when the
adult individual is a patient, he or she has the right, and therefore the
authority, to control his or her healthcare decisions .7 This means
that treatment options are evaluated and chosen from the point of
view of the patient rather than the physician or caregiver.74 As a
result, the patient is able to control and shape, in certain key respects,
his or her quality of life, and make decisions in advance as to what
treatment will be provided or withheld in case the patient falls into
dire medical circumstances and is cognitively impaired in some
specified fashion. How does the Advance Directive process work?
Advance Directives are typically signed, and sometimes drafted,
by persons of sound mind, whether healthy or ill, in anticipation of
health problems that may render them unconscious or otherwise
unable to make authoritative decisions concerning their own
medical care.75 As we saw in Lucky's case, the document can
include an instruction to take action that will, in effect, end the life
of the patient under certain conditions.76 PVS is a condition
sometimes included among those that will trigger such an end-of-
life instruction. Thus, an erroneous diagnosis or description of PVS,
if not detected, may trigger an end-of-life instruction never intended
71 INFORMATION FOR PATIENTS: PATIENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, UCSF
MED. CTR., https://www.ucsffiealth.org/pdf/patient-rightsand-responsibilities.
pdf.
71 See, e.g., Mayo Clinic Staff, Living Wills andAdvance Directives for Medical
Decisions, MAYO CLINIC (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-
lifestyle/consumer-health/in-depth/living-wills/art-20046303.
71 See Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2018).
76 See id. This is commonly done indirectly in hospital settings by way of a
"DNR" or "do not resuscitate" order. See id. The federal Patient Self-
Determination Act requires certain health care institutions to take steps to educate
all adult patients of their right to accept or refuse medical care. Id. Furthermore,
the institutions must inquire on admission whether a patient has an Advance
Directive ("AD"), and must maintain policies and procedures on ADs and provide
information about those policies and procedures to patients when admitted. Id.
The statute defines an AD as a "written instruction, such as a living will or durable
power of attorney for health care, recognized under State law ... and relating to
the provision of such care when the individual is incapacitated." Id.
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by the author. One generally does not want one's life to be ended
mistakenly on the basis of misinformation.
For that reason, given the watershed research results we have
seen above, the Advance Directive and associated practices in their
present form may merit revision. When we review statues and
regulations, official guidelines, model Directives, and related
materials used in some states, we find some to be defective and
misleading as they characterize PVS as a condition in which there is
a permanent or irreversible loss of consciousness. They may not
discuss recent research or mention the possibility that some PVS
patients may, in fact, be found to be conscious or misdiagnosed with
the help of new technology.
To illustrate this point, let's turn to various kinds of guidance
provided in three states: Virginia, New Jersey, and Florida. The
guidelines appear to be misleading as they do not reflect current
research. For example, in its official guidance for the Advance
Directive, the Commonwealth of Virginia explains the term
"terminal condition" and the expression "persistent vegetative state"
in the following way: "[terminal condition] means that your doctor
has determined that you are likely to die soon or that you are in a
persistent vegetative state, which is when you have no awareness of
your surroundings and your doctors have determined you will not
recover. '
77
These provisions may mislead the target audience because they
state that a PVS patient has no awareness of his or her surroundings.
Of course, that mistaken characterization of PVS does not square
with the research we met above, which strongly suggests that some
patients may well have such awareness.
Similarly, New Jersey's official guidance appears to be at odds
with current research. This is because the guidance indicates that
PVS patients cannot interact with their environment or other people:
"[permanent unconsciousness is a] medical condition defined as
total and irreversible loss of consciousness. The term "permanently
unconscious" includes the conditions persistent vegetative state and
77Healthcare Decisions Day: Frequently Asked Questions, VA. STATE BAR,




irreversible coma. Patients in this condition cannot interact with
their surroundings or others in any way and do not experience
pleasure or pain."" The official guidance further defines PVS as:
[a] condition of permanent unconsciousness in which the patient loses
all capacity for interaction with their environment or other people. It is
usually caused by an injury to the brain. It is normally not regarded as a
terminal condition and with the aid of medical care and artificial fluids
and nutrition patients can survive for many years.
79
Florida's statutory approach is similarly problematic.8" For
example, in the course of discussing the Advance Directive, Florida
provides the following definition of PVS:
"'Persistent vegetative state' means a permanent and irreversible
condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of
voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind (b) An inability
to communicate or interact purposefully with the environment."'"
On the contrary, as discussed above, it may well be possible for
some PVS patients to engage in voluntary action and interact
purposefully with the environment.
These rather glaring defects in Virginia, New Jersey and Florida
descriptions and characterizations of PVS and related phenomena
are derived from a misunderstanding of the complexities of PVS.
That misunderstanding is tied conceptually to diagnostic criteria
rooted in the Traditional Account, which antedate the results we
have reviewed.
7 8 N.J. BioETHics COMM'N, ST. OF N.J. COMM'N OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES FOR
HEALTH CARE: PLANNING AHEAD FOR IMPORTANT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 9
(1991) (emphasis added).
79 Id.
80 See FLA. STAT. § 765.101 (2012).
81 Id. A related provision, which concerns PVS cases in which no Advance
Directive has been prepared, provides that life-prolonging procedures may be
withheld or withdrawn only if "[t]he guardian and the person's attending
physician, in consultation with the medical ethics committee of the facility where
the patient is located, conclude that the condition is permanent and that there is
no reasonable medical probability for recovery." Id. § 765.404.
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C. Revisions and Reforms
In view of the research results presented above, and the prospect
of further important advances as a result of evolving neuroscience
technology, we strongly recommend revisions that may benefit
those whose lives are affected by PVS.
First, competent state authorities should be urged to revise or
amend all PVS-relevant statutes and government-based regulations
and guidelines, including all sample Advance Directives, "living
wills" and associated literature, so that they reflect the current state
of neuroscience research. Second, all PVS-relevant literature that
may be distributed to patients and family members by physicians,
hospitals, hospices, insurers and other participants in the healthcare
delivery system should be similarly revised. Third, such revisions
and amendments should be pursued in all jurisdictions, even though
as a demographic matter, some jurisdictions-such as Sunbelt and
other states that host substantial retirement communities-may have
much greater numbers of at-risk residents than others. Fourth, given
the pace of technological change, arrangements should be made for
periodic updates, and for those updates to be communicated in a
timely fashion through mass mailings and electronic distributions to
hospitals and other facilities where administrators, physicians,
nurses and other caregivers regularly work with prospective or
actual PVS patients.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described the basics of persistent and permanent
vegetative states and reviewed both the traditional clinical account
used to assess such states and associated problems of misdiagnosis.
We have also reviewed recent research with PVS patients that has
made use of tMRI and other neuroscience technology, and produced
important results. In particular, this research indicates that certain
PVS patients are conscious and possess significant cognitive ability.
In addition, it strongly suggests that clinicians using the traditional
account may mistakenly conclude that PVS patients lack
consciousness when, in fact, they do not. Such errors should be of
great concern because they can lead to the removal of patients from
life support, under conditions the patients never contemplated when
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signing Advance Directives, and other end-of-life protocols. We
believe such errors can be reduced significantly if current PVS
research is widely circulated among relevant parties. We believe this
can be done by amending or replacing statutes and regulations, as
well as non-legal literature, commonly used to draft and interpret
end-of-life protocols, and to educate and inform professionals and
lay persons. We strongly suggest that such measures be undertaken
without delay by competent authorities.
